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Doubtful Algorithms: Of Machine Learning Truths and Partial Accounts 
 
Louise Amoore 
 
 
During the war I worked on the atomic bomb. This result of science was 
obviously a very serious matter, it represented the destruction of people [...] Is 
there some evil involved in science? Put another way – what is the value of the 
science I had dedicated myself to – the thing I loved – when I saw what terrible 
things it could do? (Richard Feynman 1988: 239). 
 
I remain a child of the Scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and 
technoscience. My modest witness cannot ever be simply oppositional. Rather, 
s/he is suspicious, implicated, knowing, ignorant, worried, and hopeful. (Donna 
Haraway 1997: 3).  
 
In a lecture delivered to the National Academy of Sciences in 1955, the physicist 
Richard Feynman reflected on a particular relationship between the practice of doing 
science and the value of a kind of orientation to doubt. As a graduate student in the 
1940s, he worked on the physics of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos. Later, observing 
the terrible consequences of the weapons to which his physics had contributed, he 
began to doubt the value of science and its responsibility to society.1 In the years that 
followed his work on the Manhattan Project, Feynman locates the practice of science 
in a particular method that permits a freedom to doubt, an animated curiosity for 
otherwise ordinary objects, and a sustained sense of encountering an unknown future 
                                                          
1 While working on the Manhattan Project, Feynman and his colleagues calculated the energy release from the 
atomic bomb’s implosion using IBM punch card machines. Feynman describes how they learned to compute 
“around the error” when the “machine made a mistake” (1992: 131). The use of such calculating machines 
allowed the scientists to conduct multiple calculations in parallel so that “a mistake made at some point in the 
cycle only affects the nearby numbers” (1992: 131). Whereas in their early attempts at the mathematics of the 
atomic bomb the linearity of the calculation meant that errors caused them to “go back and do it over again”, 
the parallel processing of the punch cards allowed them to incorporate the error and continue to progress the 
program. In short, intrinsic to the science of the atomic bomb was a form of computation that could 
incorporate error and continue to a useable output. Some years later, after the events of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Feynman reflected on the relationship between his partial and experimental computation and the 
science of the atomic bomb: “I looked out at the buildings and I began to think, you know, about how much 
the radius of the Hiroshima bomb damage was […] How far from here was 34th Street? It’s a terrible thing that 
we made.” (1992: 136). 
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world. In his 1955 lecture, he describes how the scientist “must leave room for doubt”, 
proposes that “it is perfectly consistent to be unsure, it is possible to live and not know”, 
and makes a claim about responsibility: “permit us to question, to doubt, to not be sure, 
herein lies a responsibility to society” (1988: 245). For Feynman, there is a profound 
ambivalence within the idea of doubt, so that it expresses simultaneously “the 
openness of possibilities” into the future and the doubtfulness of science in the service 
of the state’s “monstrosities” of war (1988: 247). 
 
In common with other physicists whose experimental fragments became lodged within 
a violent calculus, Feynman’s reflections signal something of what Rosi Braidotti has 
called the “anti-Humanism” of the “turbulent years after the Second World War” (2013: 
160). Yet, as Donna Haraway acknowledges of her own subjectivity as “a child of the 
Scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and techno-science”, what it means to be 
human is not separable from technoscience and its place in war (1997: 3). Though 
Feynman’s situated and partial accounts of the science of the atomic bomb do bear 
witness to the state’s enrolment of algorithmic calculation in the service of war, these 
are not accounts that stand outside of science in opposition. Rather, the partial 
account dwells uneasily within the practice of science itself.  
 
Feynman’s ambivalent reflections on science, war, and doubt contain within them 
some elements which are of significance for our contemporary moment. Amid the 
pervasive twenty-first century political desire to incorporate doubt into calculation, 
algorithms are functioning today with the grain of doubt, allowing the uncertainties of 
data to become a means of learning and making decisions. In contrast to Feynman’s 
notion that science’s responsibility to society resides in leaving open the incalculability 
of the future, algorithms hold out the promise of securing against all possible future 
events (terrorism, irregular migration, financial crisis, climate change), via the analysis 
of data (Amoore, 2013; Fuller and Goffey, 2012). With contemporary machine learning 
algorithms, doubt becomes transformed into a malleable arrangement of weighted 
probabilities. Though this arrangement of probabilities contains within it a multiplicity 
of doubts in the model, the algorithm nonetheless condenses this multiplicity to a 
single output with a numeric value between 0 and 1. In short, the single output of the 
algorithm is rendered as a decision placed beyond doubt; a risk score or target that is 
to be actioned. 
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As doubt becomes the very terrain of algorithmic calculation, however, there are other 
forms of situated and embodied doubt that haunt the terrain. These partial and doubtful 
accounts seem to me to be present at all of the moments when an algorithm generates 
itself in relation to a corpus of data. For example, when a neural network algorithm 
doubts that it can recognise a face because the biometric datapoints were not present 
in training data, or when a desk analyst watching luminous screens of risk scores 
suspects that the model is “overfitting”: these are not moments of lack or an error, but 
a teeming plenitude of doubtfulness. What might it mean to invoke Feynman’s “room 
for doubt” or “to live and not to know” in the context of a techno-science driven to 
expose machine learning algorithms to data precisely in order to know and to act, 
indifferent to persistent doubt? In this essay I propose that in our contemporary culture, 
where the algorithm plays a major role in the calculability of doubts, the meaning of 
doubt should be reconsidered. The post Cartesian and posthuman form of doubt I 
envisage begins from embodied accounts of doubtfulness that decentre the liberal 
human subject.2 This doubtful subject is not recognisable as a unitary individual, but 
is a composite subject in whom the doubts of human and non-human beings dwell 
together, opening onto an undecidable future, where one is permitted to ask new 
questions on the political landscape. As Katherine Hayles writes: 
 
What embodiment secures is not the distinction between male and female or 
between humans who can think and machines which cannot. Rather, 
embodiment makes clear that thought is a much broader cognitive function… 
transforming the liberal subject, regarded as the model of the human since the 
Enlightenment, into the posthuman (1999: xiv). 
 
Why might the revaluing of an embodied posthuman form of doubt matter in relation 
to an age where composites of humans and algorithms are making ethico-political 
worlds? In contrast with a critique of technoscience as opaque, blackboxed and 
unaccountable, I pose the problem differently, tracing the necessarily partial accounts 
of algorithms. When Haraway describes her “modest witness”, she is concerned with 
                                                          
2 As Rosi Braidotti argues, the posthuman subject is neither “unitary or exclusively anthropocentric”, but its 
posthuman form must be a “site for political and ethical accountability” (2013: 103). 
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“telling the truth, giving testimony, guaranteeing important things” in a way that is 
“optically dense” (1997: 22-24). The truthfulness of the account is thus not grounded 
in the objective sight of the liberal reasoning subject, but precisely in the very 
impossibility of a clear-sighted and transparent account. As Judith Butler reminds us, 
“my account of myself is partial, haunted by that for which I have no definitive story”, 
so that “a certain opacity persists” in a partial account that is precisely the condition of 
ethics (2003: 29). In short, it is not the case that algorithms bring new problems of 
opacity and partiality but precisely that they illuminate the already present problem of 
locating a clear-sighted account in a knowable human subject. Here we begin to find 
the possibilities of an alternative orientation to doubt, one in which the subject 
necessarily doubts the grounds of their claims to know. 
 
Thus, the political decision to detain someone at the border, to authorize a drone strike, 
to refuse credit or employment, takes place in what Donna Haraway describes as an 
“enlarged community” of posthuman knowledge, comprising an amalgam of humans 
and algorithms as “knowing subjects” (Haraway, 1997; Braidotti, 2013: 11).  Inspired 
in part by Feynman’s foregrounding of doubt in science, and placing it into a 
conversation of curiosity with Haraway’s enlarged posthuman community, I am 
interested in how posthuman ethics might begin from a doubtful account, or from the 
impossibility of giving a coherent account of things. This form of doubt places in 
question the unity of the subject so that the “avowing subject”, as Michel Foucault 
describes it, “loosens its hold” on itself (2014: 200). This loosening of the hold on 
subjectivity is precisely a relinquishing of the idea of a grounds from which the subject 
speaks. As we see also in Foucault’s late lectures on the historical practices of truth-
telling, or what he calls “risky speech” or “parrhesia”, an assertion of the truth is 
necessarily ethico-political because it forges relations to oneself and to others 
(Foucault 2010: 43; 2011: 6). What kind of relation to self and others is entailed by the 
algorithm’s particular claims to the truth? Could ethical relations between techno-
science and society begin from the plural and posthuman doubts that grow and flourish 
when the boundaries of human and algorithm, always arbitrary, “highly permeable and 
eminently revisable”, are relinquished (Haraway 1997: 11)?  
 
Ground Truths 
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As algorithms become increasingly pervasive in supplying solutions for state decision-
making, from the risk management of borders and immigration to decisions on 
outcomes in the criminal justice system, they hold out the promise of a particular claim 
to truth. In public forums, when algorithmic decision making is interrogated, the form 
of truth is commonly said to be an efficient outputting of an optimized decision (Science 
and Technology Select Committee 2018). In fact, though, the mode of truth-telling of 
contemporary algorithms pertains to the “ground truth”: a labelled set of training data 
from which the algorithm generates its model of the world. In a process of supervised 
machine learning, the algorithms learn from a ground truth model of data labelled by 
humans. When a new set of features is extracted from the input data, these features 
are weighted in relation to the ground truth data. For example, a facial recognition 
algorithm used in urban policing is able to identify a face because of its exposure to a 
ground truth dataset of images labelled by outsourced humans via Mechanical Turk.3 
Increasingly, as deep learning algorithms derive their own ground truth by clustering 
raw unlabelled data, a model of what is ‘normal’ in the data is generated by the 
algorithms. The claim to truth made by machine learning algorithms, then, is not one 
that can be opposed to error or falsity (Parisi, 2013). Rather, the algorithm learns from 
the degree of probabilistic similarity with a ground truth, itself often generated by 
algorithms. So, when neural network algorithms at the border or in policing or 
immigration reach a decision, this is a decision derived from an output signal that is 
entirely contingent on weighted probabilities (Alpaydin, 2016: 116). The architectures 
of neural network algorithms can contain multiple hidden layers, hundreds of millions 
of weights, and billions of potential connections between neurons (Bottou 2015). Put 
simply, the mode of truth of the algorithm is entirely contingent on a particular notion 
of ground truth in the data.  
 
It is this malleable relation to a ground truth that supplies the algorithm with the 
capacity to work with the grain of doubt and uncertainty. The output of the algorithm 
                                                          
3 Though it is commonly considered that the secret or proprietary nature of algorithms renders them 
impossible to study, in fact most algorithms are openly disclosed and discussed in computer science journals 
when they are at an experimental stage. It can be many years before they are commercialized and become 
proprietary. Methodologically, the computer science and engineering journals are a means of tracing the 
emergence of particular algorithms that go on to have roles in public and private decisions. In my study of the 
notion of a “ground truth” in machine learning, see for example Yang, Zhou, Balasubramana, and Sastry (2013) 
and Hinton, Osindero and Teh (2006).      
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places a decision beyond doubt in the sense that it always already embodies the truth-
telling of the ground truth data. One could contest the output of a recidivism algorithm 
for being “false” in the sense that it wrongly assigns someone a high probability of re-
offending, for example, but its degree of truth will always remain intact in its relations 
to data. To be clear, the algorithm does not eradicate doubt, but neither does it only 
productively incorporate doubt, as has been observed in the methods of scenarios, 
catastrophe modelling, and pre-emption in geopolitics (Anderson 2010; Aradau and 
Van Munster 2011; de Goede 2012; Amoore 2013). Though this is a science that can 
hold together multiple possible versions of events simultaneously, each possibility 
weighted as a layer of computation in the algorithm, it cannot live with doubt as such. 
That is to say, the machine learning algorithm must reduce the vast multiplicity of 
possible pathways to a single output. At the instant of the actualization of an output 
signal, the multiplicity of potentials is rendered as one, that moment of decision is 
placed beyond doubt.  
 
In the sections that follow I address the practice of scientific truth telling in today’s 
machine learning algorithms, and I seek to give some revitalized life to the embodied 
doubt that is always already present within the science. In one sense this is a form of 
critique of vision-dominated objectivity that claims to have a truth beyond doubt, but 
more precisely it seeks what Donna Haraway has called an “embodied objectivity” of 
“partial perspective” (Haraway, 1988: 581; see also Daston and Galison 2007), and N. 
Katherine Hayles captures as an “embodied actuality” (1999: 287). This different 
orientation to doubt begins from the embodied doubts inhering within all notions of 
subjectivity and objectivity, doubting oneself and one’s capacity to know. With this 
orientation to doubt one could reopen the contingencies of the ground truth of data, 
giving life to the fallibilities of what the algorithm has learned about the world across 
its billions of parameters. Running against the grain of the Cartesian doubt of the 
fallibility of data derived from the senses, doubt in this alternative register is felt, lived, 
and sensed as embodied actuality in the process of an algorithm learning through its 
relations with the world.  
 
Doubtful science  
To consider the doubtfulness of partial perspectives is not the same as casting doubt 
on the algorithm as such. Indeed, the point is that one could never stand outside of 
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the algorithm to adjudicate on its veracity since one is always already implicated in the 
data that makes the algorithm’s adjudication of truth. Instead, doubtfulness here is an 
absence of grounds, expressed in the plenitude of teeming doubts in the experimental 
algorithmic model. In order to explain what might be at stake in this reorientation to 
doubt, I will turn to an example drawn from a set of interviews with the designers of 
deep learning algorithms for border and immigration control. The significance of this 
example is that a specific neural network algorithm emerges partially and 
experimentally via posthuman iterations. One of the computer scientists comments 
that he “plays with” his neural networks, taking his experimental model to the 
uniformed border operations team in the adjoining building to test it against the 
specified target outputs. His model was generated from a training data set extracted 
from past travel and immigration data and it is modified further as its output is 
calibrated against a target output. When the algorithm designers tune or adjust their 
algorithm, this space of play involves experiments with the proximity between a 
specified target value and the actual output signals from their model. They make 
adjustments of the weights in one of the hidden layers of the algorithm, observing how 
the numeric risk scores generated by their model diverge or converge on the target. 
My point is that the computations are infinitely malleable and contingent on plural 
interactions of humans and algorithms – a small change in the weighting of 
probabilities in the model will transform the output signal and, therefore, the decision.  
 
Understood as a practice that is partial, iterative and experimental, the neural network 
algorithm is not only doubtful in the sense that it supplies a contingent probability for 
an absolute decision, but moreover because it actively generates thresholds of 
normality and abnormality. Put simply, the algorithm does not need to eradicate doubt 
or establish certainty for the decision because it generates the parameters against 
which uncertainty will be adjudicated. As computer scientists Ted Dunning and Ellen 
Friedman ask of their machine learning practice, “what is normal?; how far is far, if 
something is to be considered anomalous?” (2014: 14). In their account of machine 
learning for anomaly detection, they describe precisely the kind of experimental 
playfulness with thresholds I encountered in the borders laboratory: 
 
You must experiment to determine at what sensitivity you want your model to 
flag data as anomalous. If it is set too sensitively, random noise will get flagged 
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and it will be essentially impossible to find anything useful beyond all the noise. 
Even if you’ve adjusted the sensitivity to a coarser resolution such that your 
model is automatically flagging actual outliers, you still have a choice to make 
about the level of detection that is useful to you. There are always trade-offs 
between finding everything that is out of the ordinary and getting alarms at a 
rate for which you can handle making a response. (2014: 15-16; my emphasis). 
What is happening here is that the algorithms are working with the grain of doubt, 
learning to recognise and redefine what is normal and anomalous at each parse of the 
data. In all cases where machine learning algorithms are generating targets of interest 
– from Cambridge Analytica’s targeting of the uncertain voter to Palantir’s targeting of 
the migrant of uncertain status – decisions are made in the context of profound 
doubts.4 What is the sensitivity of the model? What is the optimal threshold of false 
positives to false negatives? How should the error be distributed? The response to 
such questions is never authored by a clearly identifiable human, but rather from a 
composite of algorithm designers, frontline security officers, the experimental models 
of the mathematical and physical sciences, a training dataset, and the generative 
capacities of machine-learning classifiers working on entities and events. In the 
algorithmic systems that emerge, destined for apps-based desktops from counter-
terrorism and border security to finance and life insurance, the composite fragments 
of human and machine elements are impossible to map onto a unitary body. As Gilles 
Deleuze writes, “our condition condemns us to live among badly analysed composites, 
and to be badly analysed composites ourselves” (1991: 28), so that “arbitrarily 
grouped” elements make up both human and machine (1991: 18). It is precisely the 
arbitrary groupings and attributes of the algorithm that become effaced when it 
becomes a technoscience for resolving political difficulty.  
 
                                                          
4 In the UK, the Information Commissioner is conducting an inquiry into the use of targeted social media in the 
EU referendum, with a focus on Cambridge Analytica’s machine learning algorithms.  See 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/17/inquiry-launched-into-how-uk-parties-target-voters-
through-social-media In the US Palantir’s algorithms are generating the targets for Trump’s ICE deportation 
programme https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantir-provides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-
deportation-machine/ 
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There is a great deal at stake politically in the erasure of the doubtfulness of algorithms 
at the point of decision. Though the making of a neural net algorithm is a fraught, 
political and doubtful practice, the computational structure of such algorithms dictates 
that the final output must be a single numeric value between 0 and 1. In effect, the 
output of a neural network is itself a numeric probability, a single value distilled from a 
teeming multiplicity of potential pathways, values, weightings and thresholds. It is this 
process of condensation and reduction to one from many that allows algorithmic 
decision systems to retain doubt within computation and yet to place the decision 
beyond doubt. In the liberal humanist account of algorithms, it is at this point of output 
as decision that the oft-cited “human in the loop” is invoked as the ethical guarantor 
(Intelligence and Security Select Committee 2015; National Academy of Sciences, 
2015).5 This human in the loop is, though, an impossible figure who can never 
meaningfully engage the plurality of posthuman doubts lodged within the calculus. 
What would it mean to be able to express a posthuman doubtfulness in this context? 
How does one speak against the grain of the single output generated from millions of 
potential parameters? Is it possible to locate and amplify the doubtfulness dwelling 
within the partial fragments of the science itself?  
 
Partial accounts 
In order to detail how what Donna Haraway calls "partial perspective” might advance 
a different orientation to doubt (1988: 584), I turn here to a historical moment when the 
output of a risk algorithm led to a catastrophic decision. This is a moment when a more 
conventional Cartesian doubt was expressed that inaccurate data led to a catastrophic 
decision. However, when the event is understood as a series of partial fragments, what 
comes to matter is not whether something could be calculated accurately from data, 
but rather how partial probabilities became a singular calculus for a lethal decision. On 
January 28th 1986, 73 seconds after its launch at 11.25 am, the NASA Space Shuttle 
Challenger broke apart over the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 7 crew members, including 
Christa McAuliffe, NASA’s ‘teacher in space’. By February, President Ronald Reagan 
had established the Rogers Commission to “review the circumstances surrounding the 
                                                          
5 As machine learning algorithms are being rolled out in the policing of urban spaces, the human governing of 
the algorithm’s output has become the sole locus of ethical recourse. When a series of algorithms are 
generating the targets for facial recognition decisions, for example, it is the human operator who is said to 
make a meaningful decision to stop and question a person in the street. The process of surfacing the target of 
interest (weights, thresholds, bias..) is not perceptible by the operator. 
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accident and establish the probable cause or causes” and to “develop 
recommendations for corrective or other action” (House of Representatives, 1986). 
 
Among the 14 commissioners appointed to the investigation was the physicist Richard 
Feynman, persuaded, by his own account, in spite of “having a principle of going 
nowhere near government” after his experience of working on the atomic programme 
at Los Alamos (1988: 113). More specifically, he was wary of bureaucratic reason and 
the governing of what he thought of as an unruly science by bureaucratic rules and 
protocols. The Cold War cybernetic rise of “algorithmic rules that could be executed 
by any computer, human or otherwise” with “no authority to deviate from them” had 
extended a particular kind of “arithmetic into the realm of decision” (Erickson, Klein, 
Daston, Lemov, Sturn and Gordin, 2013: 29-30). Such an entanglement of 
mathematics and decision was of real concern to Feynamn, whose letters and diaries 
reveal a disdain for algorithmic decision procedures and axiomatic formulae, and a 
propensity to ask questions that ran against the grain of mathematical rules. “Doing it 
by algebra was a set of rules”, writes Feynman of his early encounters with 
mathematics, “which, if you followed them blindly, could produce the answer” (1988: 
17). For Feynman, algebra was a measn of imposing an axiomatic set of rules on a a 
puzzle that could otherwise intuitively work towards an unknown solution.  
 
Confronted with the Rogers’ Commission’s setting of procedural steps in the 
investigation of the Challenger disaster, Feynman worked to reinstate the doubtfulness 
present at each link in NASA’s chain of events. He travelled to meet with the engineers, 
avionics scientists and physicists whose data on particular components had made up 
the aggregate risk calculation on which NASA had based their launch decision. What 
he discovered was not a catastrophic departure from the normal rules, nor a “human 
error” or failure as such. Instead, the launch decision belonged properly to a 
posthuman composite of algorithms, where the steps of a normalized risk calculation 
protocol had been followed beyond the limits of the calculable. Rather as the 
sociologist Diane Vaughan proposes in her account of the Challenger disaster, 
“harmful actions” can be “banal”, and they can “occur when people follow all the rules” 
(1996: xiv-xv). Though Vaughan’s famous account emphasises the role of the situated 
culture of NASA in the errors made, however, Feynman’s account foregrounds the 
doubt already present within the science of the programme. Where NASA failed, 
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according to Feynman, was in its tendency to “aggregate out” the multiple small 
fractures and failings that existed at the level of the most mundane of components and 
instruments. Understood in this way, Feynman’s critical scientific method does not 
seek to correct the inaccuracies of a calculus but instead brings to the surface the 
doubts already present within each of the fragmented elements so as to open up the 
breaches in their calculative arrangement.  
  
There are two aspects of Feynman’s method I reflect on here for the possibilities they 
may offer to a critical method of partial accounts. The first is a particular reinstatement 
of doubt in data as it is given. The method of reinstatement is intended specifically to 
reinstate, or to give something back a position it had lost. This is of some significance, 
for it is not the case that doubt functions to cast uncertainty on data that was heretofore 
settled and certain. Feynman’s approach to doubt begins from the position that all 
scientific data is contingent, uncertain, and full of doubt. Indeed, among Feynman’s 
major contributions to quantum physics was his “sum over histories” method, in which 
the calculation of particle interactions must “take into account a weighted tally of every 
possible chronology” (Halpern, 2017: 114). In this sense Feynman’s physics theorised 
how a calculation might keep open the possibilities of multiple incalculable pathways.6 
As Karen Barad suggests in her account of the intimacies of feminist science studies, 
“life is not an unfolding algorithm” so that “electrons, molecules, brittlestars, jellyfish, 
coral reefs, dogs, rocks, icebergs, plants, asteroids, snowflakes, and bees stray from 
all calculable paths” (2012: 207). In my refiguring of posthuman doubt I envisage the 
unfolding algorithm itself as straying from incalculable paths. The hesitant and non-
linear temporality of the etymology of doubt, from the Latin dubitare, suggests 
precisely a straying from all calculable paths. To be doubtful could be to be full of 
doubt, in the sense of a fullness and a plenitude of other possible incalculable 
pathways.  
 
What might a method of reinstating doubt, or giving doubt a presence that it had lost, 
look like? Returning to Feynman’s investigations into the Challenger disaster, the 
                                                          
6 In his 1961-64 lectures at Caltech, Feynman explained Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as a means 
of “protecting quantum mechanics” because “if it were possible to measure the momentum and the position 
simultaneously with greater accuracy, the quantum mechanics would collapse”. As he described to his 
students, “nobody could figure out a way to measure the position and the momentum of anything – a screen, 
an electron, a billiard ball, anything – with any greater accuracy” (2011: 1-11). 
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seals of the solid fuel rocket boosters of the Shuttle were secured by the use of pairs 
of rubber ‘O rings’. It was known to NASA that, during some launches, the hot gases 
from the boosters could leak from the seals, causing what was called “blowby” over 
the liquid oxygen and nitrogen of the orbiter’s engines. Though the engineers observed 
corrosion of the O-rings over time, they assumed that the heating of the rubber O rings 
during launch caused small expansions to close the gaps in the seal. At the fatal 
launch the temperature was 28 Fahrenheit (-2 celsius), the coldest launch recorded 
prior to this had been 53 Fahrenheit. On the evening of January 27th, the night before 
the launch, the engineers at Thiokol, who manufactured the seals, warned NASA that 
the launch should not take place if the temperature was below 53 degrees. Yet, the 
public record shows that NASA, “took a management decision” on the basis that “the 
evidence was incomplete”, that “blowby and erosion had been documented above 53 
degrees”, so “temperature data should be excluded in the decision” (Feynman 1988: 
135). As Feynman writes, NASA testifed that “the analysis of existing data indicated 
that it is safe to continue flying” (137). In effect, the aggregate data of 24 past flights 
without a mission failure had placed the launch decision beyond the doubt that would 
otherwise have been reinstated by attentiveness to the components, and to the 
inscribed traces they embodied. A sense of doubtfulness that might be considered to 
be fully posthuman – dwelling in the material marks of blowby and erosion, and in the 
touch of engineers on fissures and cracks – was aggregated out in the calculation of 
an output. 
 
In historical instances such as Feynman’s account of Challenger, we can see some of 
the fallacies of an objective risk-based or data-driven decision placed beyond doubt. 
Remarking on the computer model used by NASA in support of their launch decision, 
Feynman writes that: “It was a computer model with various assumptions. You know 
the danger of computers, it’s called GIGO: garbage in, garbage out” (1988: 107). In 
order to question the assumptions of the computer model, Feynman began to focus 
on the fragments of data and their associated probabilities, reinstating doubt within 
each element. Understood in this way, the probabilistic calculation of risk gives way to 
what Donna Haraway has called “partial, locatable knowledges”, in which there is the 
“possibility of new webs of connections” (Haraway 1988: 584). NASA had testified to 
the Commission that the probability of failure of a mission was calculated to be 1 in 
100,000. “Did you say 1 in 100,000?”, queried Feynman, “that means you could fly the 
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shuttle every day for 300 years between accidents?” (Feynman, 1988: 180). Opening 
a breach in the calculation, Feynman gathered together the scientists who had worked 
on the various different components of Challenger, asking them to estimate the 
probability of failure of the Shuttle, and to write this probability onto a slip of paper. 
When he collected the fragments of paper with their pieces of data, he found that the 
calculus reflected the particular and situated relationship to a material component and 
its properties. Thus, for the seal engineers the probability of failure was felt to be 1 in 
25, for the orbiter’s engines 1 in 200, with none of the data elements showing NASA’s 
aggregate probability of 1 in 100,000. Feynman’s point was not to correct the 
inaccuracy but rather to dramatize its incalulability. From the paper fragments of each 
embodied likelihood, gathered together as incongruous scraps, there emerges the 
possibility of new webs of connections. 
 
The second aspect of Feynman’s method I will discuss here is the affordance of 
capacities to algorithmic devices – in particular, an affordance of the capacity to give 
accounts of themselves and their limits. One approach to such affordances would be 
to say that, put simply, when something fails, it also speaks to us and tells us 
something of its limit points (Bennett 2010). Yet, this is not merely a question of how 
the “non-human” thing, in the Heideggerian (1954) tradition, has a capacity to gather 
a community of other human and non-human beings to it. Instead, as Katherine Hayles 
reminds us, “cognition is much broader than human thinking”, so that cognitive 
capacities are afforded to “other animals as well as technical devices” within a “rich 
ecology of collaborating, reinforcing, contesting and conflicting interpretations (Hayles 
2016: 29). Within this broad ecology of cognition, the always present ethico-political 
difficulty of humans giving an account must necessarily extend to the partial accounts 
of other beings. 
 
When Feynman found that the Rogers Commission was unwilling or unable to hear 
his critical account, he brought with him part of his material scientific community, 
inviting the material device of the O-ring to give an account in the public forum. As the 
government officials and press gathered for a meeting with the panel, Feynman placed 
a piece of rubber O-ring in a clamp bought in a downtown hardware store. Requesting 
a glass of iced water, he dropped in the materials and waited for them to cool. When 
the rubber was removed from the glass, brittle and compressed, it broke apart before 
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the assembled audience. One reading of the event of the public accountability of the 
O-ring is that Feynman follows the “structure of heroic action” in science, speaking 
objectively and “self-invisibly” through the “clarity and purity of objects” (Haraway 
1997: 24, 34). Certainly the now famous New York Times report of the O-ring event, 
citing Feynman’s few words: “there is no resilience in this material when it is at a 
temperature of 32 degrees”, bears a form of witness close to that of Haraway’s critique. 
However, I locate a different form of account here, one in which there is no unified 
authorial source of truth, but rather a distributed and oblique account of the 
impossibility of resolving truthfulness before the public. Refusing accountability as 
such, the different mode of giving account is closer to what Karen Barad describes as 
the “condensation of responsibility” in matter, wherein the multiple past decisions are 
lodged within the object, engaging us in “a felt sense of causality” (2012: 208). In this 
way, a material limit that was ordinary in the embodied experiences of engineers and 
materials scientists – familiar to their touch – could be expressed as a claim that could 
be heard in the world. It is not the case that Feynman’s claim expressed the voice of 
“the victor with the strongest story” (Haraway 1997: 35), but rather his embodied, 
tactile and local account was derided and rejected by the Commission. At the specific 
moment I describe, Feynman speaks against the grain of Cartesian method and 
instantiates a mode of doubt more commonly feminized and annexed with subjectivity. 
It is precisely this mode of intuitive causality and embodied doubtfulness that I am 
seeking as a resistant and critical form of responsibility.  
 
Risky speech 
To speak of the excesses and limits of technoscience in our contemporary present 
has become extraordinarily difficult. Every output of the machine learning algorithm, 
even where it leads to wrongful detention or racialized false positives, is reincorporated 
into the adjustment or “tuning” of the weights of a future model. However, the method 
of reinstating doubtfulness within algorithmic arrangements does have the potential to 
yield a kind of “risky speech” or “parrhesia”, as Michel Foucault describes, where an 
account is given that places itself at risk (2011: 79). For Foucault, the defining quality 
of parrhesia, for Foucault, is that the parrhesiast is bound to the truth of their claim, 
but they place themselves at risk in so doing, because they speak against the grain of 
prevailing thought. As Judith Butler comments on Foucault’s mode of criticism, 
parrhesia “involves putting oneself at risk”, “imperilling the very possibility of being 
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recognized by others”, and risking unrecognizability as a subject” (2003: 19). What 
marks out parrhesia from other forms of discursive and performative speech is its 
capacity to open onto an indeterminate future: 
 
There is a major and crucial difference. In a performative utterance, the given 
elements of the situation are such that when the utterance is made, the effect 
which follows is known and ordered in advance, it is codified […] In parrhesia, 
on the other hand, the irruption determines an open situation, or rather opens 
the situation and makes possible effects which are, precisely not known. 
Parrhesia does not produce a codified effect; it opens up an unspecified risk 
(Foucault 2010: 62, emphasis in original). 
 
Understood thus, parrhesiatic speech opens up a breach in a situation and makes 
possible effects that could not be ordered in advance. It is this opening of the situation 
beyond codified effects that I consider to be so very necessary in an age of machine 
learning outputs. Once could be doubtful of the claims of a human guarantor of ethics, 
and of the bias and discrimination that could be excised from the algorithm, for 
example, and begin instead from the unspecified risks emerging between the 
algorithm and the data corpus from which it learns. 
 
Ultimately, on discovering that the Rogers Commission report contained a previously 
undisclosed “tenth recommendation”, sheltering the risk algorithm within “error” and 
commending NASA’s work and mission to the nation, Richard Feynman refused to 
add his signature to the report. His fellow commissioners sought to persuade him, 
suggesting that the tenth recommendation was “only motherhood and apple pie”, and 
that “we must say something for the president” (Feynman 1988). The tenth 
recommendation, which would authorize a particular decided future of continued 
NASA missions, was demarcated from the real science of objective findings, and 
rendered maternal and nation-building. 
 
In response, Feynman asked what kind of truth could be spoken to the government, 
“why can I not tell the truth about my science to the President?” In the event, his own 
report appeared as an appendix to the published document, titled “personal 
observations on the reliability of the shuttle”, as though his merely personal situated 
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account could only be subjective and without grounds. Feynman’s appendix is risky 
speech in Foucault’s sense, an argument that places him at risk, runs against the grain 
of the Commission report, and challenges the form of truth-telling of the public report. 
In this sense, to be doubtful is to open onto the contingency of a situation and to be 
responsive to unspecified effects. The fullness of an embodied doubt I envisage here 
is a critical cousin to Lauren Berlant’s notion of a “cruel optimism”, where a “cluster of 
promises could seem embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a 
bunch of cells, smells, a good idea” (2011: 23). The cruelty Berlant so vividly describes 
is a “relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization 
is discovered to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (p.24). 
Though Berlant does not probe directly what it might mean politically to be doubtful of 
the promises as they embed in a person, a thing or a technology, her work does 
envisage the making of claims on the present so that there remains “the possibility of 
the event taking shape otherwise” (2011: 262). Understood thus, to be doubtful could 
be to experience a fullness or multiplicity of the present moment and the many ways 
it might unfold, such that the cruelly optimistic promises of technoscience do not cling 
so tightly to ideas of the “optimal” or the “good idea”. The optimism of the algorithm is 
founded on its optimization, that is to say on its capacity to reduce the fullness of the 
present moment to an output to be actioned in the future.  
 
Posthuman doubt 
If the signalling of multiple errors and faults in contemporary machine learning 
algorithms cannot meaningfully provide a ground for critique, then can there be risky 
speech amid algorithmic techniques? I note here that throughout the process of 
following algorithm designers, there has been a curious mood of twinned optimism 
and doubt: optimism that a “good enough” model can always be found, and doubt that 
elements of “junk” data in social media or image files could ever be adequately 
prepared or labelled. If, however, the very many misidentified faces in biometric 
systems, or wrongly seized assets in an algorithmic immigration system merely 
“harness dysfunctions, errors, and crisis”, as Luciana Parisi suggests, in order to 
“script uncertainties within the programming of relations” (2013: 96), then doubting the 
veracity or accuracy of the data could never be sufficient. The faults, errors and 
inaccuracies that would have been considered impediments to programming in past 
statistical modes, have become  important stimuli for the machine learning algorithm 
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to train, learn and develop. Put differently, Feynman excavated and amplified the 
doubt within analogue data elements by painstakingly reconstructing the plural 
probabilities of each finite piece. Yet, if this method allows us to pause and dwell within 
the doubtfulness of the calculus, can we imagine today an equivalent method of asking 
the computer scientists we research to please “write the probability of the failure of 
your piece of the machine-learning software on this piece of paper”? And how would 
the imagination of such probabilities extend to the future actions of one algorithm on 
another? How would it account for errors that are productively reabsorbed into the 
model? If one seeks a method to try to reinstate the doubt already lodged within the 
data, within its weighting and thresholds, then what kind of truth-telling practice might 
this be?  
 
When Richard Feynman asked the scientists on the Shuttle programme why the 
fragments of their doubts had not found their way into the future calculations of risk 
assembled by NASA, he was informed that “it is better if they don’t hear the truth, then 
they cannot be in a position to lie to Congress” (1988: 214). The problem of truth-telling 
in this instance lies less with science as such, and more with the various ways in which 
embodied doubtfulness in science does not give political accounts of itself. Similarly, 
when the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was found to have lied 
to Congress on the analysis of data on US citizens in March 2013, he later argued that 
he had provided the “least untruthful answer possible in a public hearing” (Harding 
2014; Greenwald 2013). To speak against the grain of the promise algorithms make 
in the name of geopolitical security is to bring to the public assembly a kind of 
contemporary heresy. Following the UK terror attacks in Manchester and London in 
2017, for example, the official inquiry by David Anderson QC has concluded that what 
is required is a more effective algorithm for the identification of high risk individuals 
among 20,000 so-called closed subjects of interest.7 In effect, this implies training an 
algorithm to recognise the attributes of known individuals in the dataset in order to 
identify similar attributes among unknown future subjects. The weighted probabilities 
among the 20,000 will be used to generate target outputs for security action. To signal 
                                                          
7https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664682/Attacks_in_London
_and_Manchester_Open_Report.pdf Last accessed December 2017. 
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the doubtfulness and of the arrangement of probabilities of such an algorithm is to risk 
annulling the promise of a securable future.  
 
Let us turn to the truth telling of our times and why it has become so difficult to reinstate 
the doubt which would be necessary for a meaningful politics. The key doubt here is 
the doubtfulness of the grounds on which one makes a political claim. As Thomas 
Keenan writes, “what we call ethics and politics only come into being or have any force 
and meaning thanks to their ungroundedness”, so that “we have politics” precisely 
because we have no “reliable standpoints” (1997: 3). If a future political claim is to be 
possibIe, then “its difficulty and its persistence stem from its terrifying, challenging, 
removal of guarantees” (1997: 42). If there are to be future claims to human rights not 
yet registered or heard, for example, then there must always also be doubts haunting 
the possibility of rights, doubts that acknowledge the irresolvability of all political 
claims. Here, doubt pervades what Keenan describes as a “darkened frontier” where 
the essential difficulties of politics must take place, and where all decision must, 
following Derrida, “act in the night of non-knowledge and non-rule” (Keenan 1997: 12; 
Derrida 1992: 26). In holding out the promise of resolving political difficulty – coming 
out of the darkness with the condensed output of a machine learning algorithm –  this 
technoscience harms the very terrain of the political. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
algorithmic technique promises to resolve the political by holding together a multiplicity 
of possibilities, whilst carving out a space for a singular decision (Amoore 2013; 2014). 
This is not to say that the decision is made without doubt. On the contrary, it is doubtful, 
full of doubt and yet it decides with indifference. 
 
Seated in the audience in a technology company’s auditorium, I watched the pitch 
made to government departments in the name of resolving political difficulty with 
machine learning. Recorded Future explained how their “threat centaur” machine 
learning algorithms would “scrape the web for geopolitical events” and to send “real 
time alerts” on “political protests, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest”.8 As the algorithm 
designers describe the system, it deploys a combination of rule-based and deep 
learning algorithms. The rule-based algorithms are said to be based on “human 
intuition” about whether “an entity is associated with some kind of risk”, while the 
                                                          
8 https://www.recordedfuture.com/artificial-threat-intelligence/ Last accessed December 2017. 
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machine learning algorithms are trained on a “large data set, using trusted threat list 
sources as ground truth for what constitutes a malicious entity” (ibid: 4). The figure of 
the “centaur” in the algorithmic system is a posthuman body with a capacity to reach 
an unsupervised algorithmic judgement (“this event is critical”) but also to display “a 
human readable motivation for that judgement” so that action can be authorized 
against a threat.  [insert figures 1 and 2 here] 
 
At one level the algorithms of the threat detection centaurs appear to run counter to 
the form of risk calculation observed by Feynman at NASA. The smallest of infractions 
or the subtlest of signals of a component failure or a change in online clickstream 
patterns, for example, is said to yield a threat alert to the centaurs. Like the Rolls Royce 
jet engines that yield real-time data on the performance of aircraft as they fly, the 
twenty-first century O-ring would almost certainly be given a data voice. And yet, at 
the level of practices of truth-telling, there is something of significance here. The 
Challenger launch decision teemed with a cacophony of embodied doubt – on the part 
of the engineers, physicists and mathematical modellers, in communion with their non-
human partners – and yet, the decision itself was placed beyond doubt. What we are 
seeing emerge in contemporary algorithmic technoscience is an orientation to truth-
telling that says that all geopolitical decisions can be placed beyond doubt. 
 
How might one intervene in models such as the threat centaur in ways that reinstate 
the doubtfulness of the algorithm? It is necessary to engage the political traces of 
machine learning algorithms, to be curious about them, to doubt them, but also to listen 
to the doubt they themselves express in the world.9 In engaging research methods 
that follow elements of an algorithmic solution as they travel and have onward life, I 
am trying to be a receptive listener when the piece of data appears to say “you do 
know that I cannot really be cleaned, I remain in there, muddying the calculation”; or 
when the biometric matching algorithm says “in 14% of cases, where ambient lighting 
exceeds these parameters, I cannot be read”; or when the pattern recognition 
algorithm says “the training data set I have been exposed to has established what 
looks normal or abnormal to me”. For there is doubt, it proliferates everywhere, at 
                                                          
9 Writing on the method of “learning from machine learning” Adrian Mackenzie proposes that understanding 
how particular algorithms, such as random forest decision trees, “order differences” could substantially 
“change how we relate to what we see, feel, sense, hear, or think” (2017: 11). 
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every step in the application of algorithmic solutions to political questions, doubt lives 
and thrives and multiplies. And, where there is an ineradicable doubt, there is the 
darkened frontier and also the potential for politics. Inspired by Richard Feynman’s 
method of reinstating doubt in the data points, and being an interlocutor for the people 
and things ‘in the engine’ who actively give accounts of limit points of all kinds, I urge 
that we too experiment, like the algorithmic models do, iteratively and recursively 
giving doubtful accounts of the output of a calculation.                  
 
Conclusions: the open channel 
To speak in praise of an embodied form of posthuman doubt is to draw together a 
number of things which do not sit together easily in terms of critique. The form of doubt 
I propose is to be distinguished from Cartesian skepticism, for it does not seek to 
annexe fallible sensory doubts in the pursuit of foundational truths. As posthuman life 
forms, the doubtful subjects I depict here dwell uneasily within partial and situated 
knowledges and, when they make a claim in the world, they do so in ways that stray 
from calculable paths. I include within this category of doubtful subjects all those 
whose science bears a responsibility for an apparently risk-free, error tolerant political 
decision, from drone strikes to border controls and from voter targeting to immigration 
decisions. In so doing, I follow Foucault’s sense that the scientist and the geometer do 
not stand outside of the capacity for parrhesiatic or risky speech, alongside Karen 
Barad’s caution that we are materially immersed in and inseparable from science. 
Doubtfulness expresses the many ways in which algorithms dwell within us, just as we 
too dwell as data within their layers, so that we could not stand apart from this science 
even if we wanted to. The doubtfulness of our relations to ourselves and to algorithmic 
systems means that critique will always involve “putting oneself at risk”, as Judith 
Butler describes it, and risking “unrecognizability as a subject” (2003: 19, 45). In this 
way, the unrecognizability of the subject extends into the opacity of the algorithm, so 
that new forms of composite subject emerge. The next time one hears that the “black 
box” of the algorithm should be opened, one might usefully reflect on the obscured 
unrecognizability of all forms of self and ask how such an opening could be possible. 
 
To express doubt in these terms is to try to find a means to respond to algorithms that 
incorporate doubt into computation, converting doubts into weighted probabilities that 
will yield a condensed output that can be actioned. A critical response cannot merely 
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doubt the algorithm itself, pointing to its errors and contingencies, for it is precisely 
through these variations that the algorithm learns what to do. Instead, a posthuman 
orientation to doubt decentres the authoring subject, even and especially where this 
author is a machine, so that the grounds – and the “ground truths” – are called into 
question. Understood in this way, to doubt is also to reopen a “decision worthy of the 
name”, as Derrida notes, or to open onto “a politics of difficulty”, as Thomas Keenan 
describes, where the “break with the humanist paradigm” does not close the ethico-
political but provides its very starting point (Derrida, 1995: 24; Keenan, 1997: 2).  
 
What could it mean to value doubtfulness as a posthuman critical faculty, to reinstate 
doubt into the composite creature that is automated algorithmic calculation? It is not 
the same thing at all as to call for an ethics of human decision in machinic security 
(putting the human back in the loop), or to say science at the service of geopolitics is 
intrinsically malevolent. Instead, it expands the space for doubt beyond what Deleuze, 
following Bergson, calls “the decisive turn”, where lines diverge according to their 
differences in kind (Deleuze 2011: 29). Understood in this way, the action precipitated 
by the output of the algorithm is never placed beyond the darkness of doubt, for it 
carries doubt within, it does not know what is around the decisive turn. Though 
contemporary algorithms reduce the multiplicity to one at the point of output signal, 
they do not leave behind the knots of doubt that dwelled within the multiple hidden 
layers. As Karen Barad writes on Feynman’s quantum field theory, where the electron 
absorbs its own proton and “there is something immoral about that”, the action of the 
body is never fully beyond doubt (2012: 212). 
 
In so many ways, of course, Richard Feynman is a curious figure to invite into 
conversation with Haraway, Braidotti, Hayles, and Barad on science and the ethico-
political, particularly given his role in the material violence of the nuclear age. Yet, the 
point is that we none of us can stand outside of this science and judge it to be good or 
evil, to say “things should not be this way”. We are it and it is us, such that critique 
cannot begin from an outside to the algorithm. As Barad suggests, “ethicality entails 
noncoincidence with oneself” (2010: 265) so that to give an ethical account is to resist 
anchoring the claim. Doubt does not stand outside and pronounce judgement, doubt 
is also interior, essential to subjectivity, for we doubt ourselves. For Feynman, doubt 
is the open channel in politics and in science: 
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If we take everything into account… then I think we must frankly admit that we 
do not know. But, in admitting this, we have probably found the open channel 
[..] The openness of possibilities was an opportunity, and doubt and discussion 
were essential […] We must leave the door to the unknown ajar […] It is our 
responsibility to leave the people of the future a free hand (Feynman, 1992: 
247). 
 
To find the open channel and to leave the door to the unknown ajar is to resist the 
promises made that the future is resolvable through the optimized output of algorithmic 
decision engines. To leave the door ajar is to reopen the very many points in the 
algorithm where another future was possible, where the hinge does not quite 
demarcate the axis of possible movement. Whilst the enfolded doubts of the 
algorithm’s feedback loop and back propagation deny the impossibility and difficulty of 
decision, an embodied doubtfulness pauses with the undecidability of alternative 
pathways and their contingent probabilities. The claim to a ground truth in data that 
pervades our contemporary political imagination precisely closes the door to the 
future, offering algorithmic solutions to resolve the difficulties of decision. To reinstate 
embodied doubt within the algorithm, and to allow the components of the badly formed 
composite to speak of their limits, is to seek to leave the door ajar for the making of 
future political claims. For it is these future unknown claims that can never appear in 
the clusters, attributes, and thresholds of the algorithm.    
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